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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiffs Transport Workers Union of America, Local 290 
("Transport Workers"), Leonard F. Browna, and William 
Haggerty instituted this action against Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA") and 
SEPTA's Retirement Plan for Supervisory, Administrative 
and Management Employees ("SAM Plan"). Plaintiffs claim 
that defendants violated the Contract Clauses of the United 
States and Pennsylvania Constitutions by modifying the 
SAM Plan in August 1995 to require, as a condition of 
participation, a contribution of employee earnings to the 
Plan. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district 
court granted defendants' motion and denied plaintiffs' 
motion. This appeal followed. We will affirm. 
 
I. 
 
SEPTA was created pursuant to the Metropolitan 
Transportation Authorities Act of August 14, 1963 ("MTA 
Act") and is the sponsor of the SAM Plan, which was 
established by SEPTA in 1965 and covers approximately 
2,300 supervisory and management-level employees. SEPTA 
was authorized to establish the SAM Plan by the MTA Act, 
which provides that: 
 
       There shall be established and maintained by the 
       authority a pension and retirement system to provide 
       for payments when due under such system or as 
       modified from time to time by resolution of the 
       [authority's] board. For this purpose, both the board 
       and the participating employees shall make such 
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       periodic payments to the established system as may be 
       determined by resolution. 
 
74 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 1724(c). 
 
Prior to the events giving rise to this litigation, the SAM 
Plan provided that SEPTA would "contribute . . . such 
amounts . . . as are required, in accordance with the 
funding policy established by the Board under the terms 
and conditions of [the] Plan, to fund the Benefits provided 
under [the] Plan." App. at A77. The Plan further provided 
that the "Board shall have the power, at any time and from 
time to time, . . . to modify, alter or amend the Plan and/or 
Master Trust in any manner which it deems desirable 
provided that no amendment . . . may affect the rights, 
duties or responsibilities of the Trustee without its prior 
written consent." App. at A116. Prior to October 8, 1995, no 
employee contribution had been required of employees 
covered by the SAM Plan. 
 
Effective in December 1995, the SAM Plan was amended 
by the Board to require that employees covered by the Plan 
would contribute to it in the future .9% of their earnings up 
to the Social Security covered compensation level and 1.1% 
of their earnings above that level. The benefits provided by 
the Plan were not altered in connection with this 
amendment. The right to benefits vested as of December 
1995 was not affected but payment of the contribution in 
the future was a condition of accruing any additional 
benefits under the Plan. Simultaneously, the Board 
approved, effective October 1995, a three percent wage 
increase for the individual plaintiffs and others similarly 
situated. 
 
Plaintiffs' suit seeks declarative and injunctive relief from 
the employee contribution requirement. Their complaint 
asserts that the Board's amendment of the Plan, and the 
MTA Act under which it was authorized, both violate the 
Contract Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania 
Constitutions. 
 
II. 
 
The United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, 
that "[n]o state shall enter into any . . . Law impairing the 
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Obligation of Contracts." U.S. Const. art. I, S 10. In order to 
prove a violation of this constitutional provision, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate that a "change in state law has `operated 
as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship.' " 
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 186 (1992) 
(quoting Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 
234, 244 (1978)). Thus, Contract Clause analysis requires 
three threshold inquiries: (1) whether there is a contractual 
relationship; (2) whether a change in a law has impaired 
that contractual relationship; and (3) whether the 
impairment is substantial. See Romein, 503 U.S. at 186. If 
it is determined that a substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship has occurred, the court must 
further inquire whether the law at issue has a legitimate 
and important public purpose and whether the adjustment 
of the rights of the parties to the contractual relationship 
was reasonable and appropriate in light of that purpose. 
See Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 
242-44 (1978); Nieves v. Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 819 
F.2d 1237, 1243 (3d Cir. 1987). If the impaired contractual 
relationship is between private parties, the court will defer 
to the legislative judgment concerning the importance of the 
public purpose and the manner in which that purpose is 
being pursued. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas 
Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412-13 (1983). If the state 
is a party to the contract, "complete deference to a 
legislative assessment of reasonableness and necessity is 
not appropriate because the State's self-interest is at 
stake." United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 
26 (1977). 
 
The district court granted summary judgment for 
defendants on their federal constitutional claims because it 
concluded that the SEPTA resolution modifying the SAM 
Plan did not "constitute an exercise of legislative power," 
Op. at 11, and, accordingly, was not a "law" within the 
meaning of the Contract Clause. We find it unnecessary to 
decide this issue. We conclude that even if the Plan is 
regarded as establishing a contractual relationship and the 
Plan amendment is considered a "law," plaintiffs have failed 
to demonstrate that the contractual relationship has been 
"substantially impaired." 
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"Contracts enable individuals [and public entities] to 
order their . . . affairs according to their particular needs 
and interests. Once arranged, those rights and obligations 
are binding under the law, and the parties are entitled to 
rely on them." Allied Structural, 438 U.S. at 245. The 
purpose of the Contract Clause is to protect the legitimate 
expectations that arise from such contractual relationships 
from unreasonable legislative interference. Thus, we must 
determine whether there has been a substantial 
impairment of a contractual relationship by inquiring 
whether legitimate expectations of the plaintiffs have been 
substantially thwarted. We conclude that the Plan 
Amendment did not frustrate any legitimate expectation of 
the plaintiffs. 
 
Plaintiffs' argument that the MTA Act itself violates their 
rights under the Contract Clause need not detain us long. 
The only legitimate expectations plaintiffs have identified 
are those allegedly arising from the Plan. The Plan was 
adopted pursuant to the authority conferred by the MTA 
Act and, therefore, did not exist prior to its enactment. It 
necessarily follows that the MTA Act did not substantially 
impair any contractual expectations of the plaintiffs. 
 
Turning to the plaintiffs' expectations under the Plan, we 
first note that the Act by which it was authorized expressly 
contemplated that the provisions of any pension and 
retirement system created thereunder would be subject to 
modification from time to time by the Authority's Board and 
that the employees covered might be required by resolution 
of the Board to make contributions. See 74 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. S 1724(c). The Plan itself also expressly provided that 
the Board was authorized to amend the terms of the Plan 
"in any manner which it deems desirable." App. at A116. 
Moreover, the Plan document contains an elaborate 
procedure for terminating the Plan. While the document 
evinces an intent to continue the Plan "indefinitely," it also 
reserves the right to "discontinue, suspend or reduce 
[SEPTA's] contributions [to the plan], or to terminate the 
Plan and/or Master Trust and/or any participating plan 
therein." App. at A117. The ability to reduce state 
contributions or terminate the Plan entirely also supports 
the proposition that SEPTA reserves the right to alter the 
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scheme of funding embodied in the Plan. These provisions 
of the SAM Plan and the enabling statute give notice that 
the terms of the Plan are alterable by SEPTA and that an 
employee contribution may well be required as a condition 
of participation in the Plan. Under these circumstances, an 
employee's reasonable expectation from the Plan contract 
cannot include a guarantee that an employee contribution 
would never be required. 
 
In support of their contention that they did have 
legitimate expectations that were thwarted by the Board's 
amendment, plaintiffs rely primarily on the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Association of 
Pennsylvania State College and University Faculties v. State 
System of Higher Education, 479 A.2d 962 (Pa. 1984) 
("APSCUF "). The plaintiffs there were covered by 
Pennsylvania's State Employees Retirement Fund, a 
statutory retirement program mandated for certain state 
employees. See 71 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. S 5301 et seq. The 
terms of that program were established in the statute. As 
originally adopted, the statute required an employee 
earnings contribution of 5% with the proviso that "in no 
case shall any member's rate . . . be greater than [the] 
contribution rate on the effective date of [the Code]." 
APSCUF, 479 A.2d at 963. The APSCUF litigation arose as 
a result of a subsequent legislative amendment to the 
statute that required an additional contribution from 
covered employees of 1.25% of their earnings. The "only 
effects [of the amendment were] to increase the contribution 
required by members and to save the Commonwealth one 
percent (1%) of its budgeted payroll. The dollar amount of 
retirement benefits remain[ed] the same; members [were] 
simply required to pay more for each pension dollar they 
[would] eventually receive." Id. at 964-65. The Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania held that this amendment violated 
the Contract Clause of both the federal and state 
constitutions. 
 
Plaintiffs read APSCUF as establishing a rule that under 
the Contract Clause of the federal constitution, a public 
employee covered by a pension plan is entitled to the 
benefits existing at the time her employment commenced 
without regard to whether the employer has reserved the 
 
                                6 
  
right to modify the plan at any time. If APSCUF established 
such a rule, we would not be bound by it. Whether a 
contract was formed and what terms were included for 
purposes of the Contract Clause are federal questions. See 
General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992). 
But we do not understand the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in APSCUF to be saying anything as novel as plaintiffs 
suggest. Contrary to plaintiffs' suggestion, that case does 
not hold that the terms of a public pension plan are 
irrelevant to a determination of whether rights protected by 
the Contract Clause have been substantially impaired. 
 
It is helpful to place APSCUF in historic perspective. In 
Penne v. Reis, 132 U.S. 464 (1889), the Supreme Court 
held that public employee pension programs constitute 
gratuities that a state may freely revoke. While Penne has 
never been expressly overruled, most state supreme courts 
subsequently rejected the "gratuity" approach in favor of an 
approach that viewed such programs as creating implied- 
in-fact unilateral contracts. See Parker v. Wakelin, 123 F.3d 
1, 6 (1st Cir. 1997). The modern trend in those courts has 
thus been to protect pension rights on the theory that a 
state's promise of pension benefits represents an offer that 
can be accepted by the employee's performance. See id. 
They have taken different views, however, regarding the 
point at which rights under public pension programs 
become protected from change where no right to modify is 
expressly reserved by the employer. See, e.g. , Kestler v. 
North Carolina Local Gov't Employees' Retirement System, 
48 F.3d 800, 804 (4th Cir. 1995) (no contract rights prior 
to retirement); Petras v. State Bd. of Pension Trustees, 464 
A.2d 894, 896 (Del. 1983) (rights not subject to change 
after conditions for vesting under terms of plan satisfied); 
State of Nevada Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Keating, 903 F.2d 
1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1990) (all employees have contract 
rights "subject to reasonable modification"); Oregon State 
Police Officers' Ass'n v. Oregon, 918 P.2d 765, 773 (Or. 
1996) (contract formed "on acceptance of employment or 
after a probationary period"); Booth v. Sims, 456 S.E.2d 
167, 184 (W. Va. 1995) (contract formed "after employees 
have substantially relied to their detriment"). 
 
"[P]ublic employee retirement benefits in Pennsylvania are 
viewed as being part of a contractual agreement between 
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the public employer and the employee." Newport Township 
v. Margalis, 532 A.2d 1263, 1265 (Pa. Commw. 1987) 
(citing Wright v. Allegheny County Retirement Bd., 134 A.2d 
231 (Pa. 1957)). The terms of the contractual agreement in 
APSCUF did not include a reservation by the employer of a 
right to modify or terminate the plan. To the contrary, the 
terms of the plan specified a rate for the employees' 
contributions and expressly provided that that rate should 
not be exceeded. The court had no problem determining 
that the legislative amendment would constitute a Contract 
Clause violation for those employees who had accepted the 
state's unilateral offer by serving until the retirement 
eligibility requirements have been met. The more serious 
issue was whether the same was true with respect to those 
employees who had not satisfied those requirements. The 
court held that "non-vested state employees are entitled to 
the same constitutional protection as vested employees." 
APSCUF, 479 A.2d at 965. This conclusion was consistent 
with traditional contract principles; when an offeror invites 
an offeree to accept by rendering a performance a unilateral 
contract is formed when performance begins. See 
Restatement of Contracts (Second) S 45(1). 
 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said nothing in 
APSCUF about whether state employees covered by a 
pension program expressly reserving the right to amend or 
terminate their rights have a legitimate contractual 
expectancy that can be substantially impaired for purposes 
of Contract Clause analysis. It would be inconsistent with 
traditional principles of contract law to simply ignore such 
a reservation. As the Restatement explains, the rule vesting 
unilateral contract rights at the beginning of performance 
"is designed to protect the offeree in justifiable reliance on 
the offeror's promise, and the rule yields to a manifestation 
of intention which makes reliance unjustified. A reservation 
of power to revoke after performance has begun means that 
as yet there is no promise and no offer." Restatement of 
Contracts (Second) S 45, Comment (b). 
 
As we have noted, the purpose of the Contract Clause is 
to allow parties to agree upon their respective rights and 
obligations and then to protect their expectations from 
legislative interference. Given this objective, we conclude 
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that the Contract Clause should not be applied in a manner 
that would produce a result in direct conflict with the terms 
of the parties' bargain. 
 
As a matter of federal law, we are aware, of course, that 
ERISA statutorily prohibits modifications of benefits after 
they have accrued. We are also aware that the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit has recognized "an emergent 
common-law rule" that express reservations of the power to 
modify and terminate are ineffective as to those employees 
who have satisfied the plan requirements for retirement 
benefits. See McGrath v. Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 
F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 1996) (collecting cases). We have 
found no case, however, holding that an express 
reservation of a right to modify is ineffective with respect to 
employees who have not satisfied the plan requirements for 
retirement benefits. It necessarily follows that we have 
found no case holding that the rights of such employees 
under the Contract Clause were violated by an exercise of 
such an express reservation. Indeed, the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals in McGrath held to the contrary, see 88 F.3d at 
20, and its conclusion is consistent with the other case law 
we have found dealing with reservations of the right to 
amend. See, e.g., City of Charleston v. Public Service 
Comm'n of West Virginia, 57 F.3d 385, 394 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that a state law did not impair a public contract 
when the contract expressly stated that its terms were 
subject to legislative regulations); National Ass'n of Gov't 
Employees v. Commonwealth, 646 N.E.2d 106, 110-11 
(Mass. 1995) (collective bargaining agreement not impaired 
where legislature reserved power to determine employee 
health insurance contribution rate); Helicon Corp. v. 
Borough of Brownsville, 449 A.2d 118, 121 (Pa. Commw. 
1982) (cable television contract not impaired by city rate 
regulation where contract expressly contemplated legislative 
changes). 
 
In short, we conclude that SEPTA employees enrolled in 
the SAM Plan had no reasonable expectation when they 
joined the Plan that a contribution would not be required 
as a condition for future participation in the Plan.1 It 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Note further that the employee earnings contribution requirement is 
prospective in effect. See App. at A78. Thus, there is no allegation in 
this 
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necessarily follows that there has been no violation of the 
Contract Clause of the federal Constitution. 
 
III. 
 
The Contract Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution 
provides that "[n]o . . . law impairing the obligation of 
contracts . . . shall be passed." Pa. Const. art. I, S 17. We 
are, of course, bound to apply this provision in the same 
manner it would be applied by the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania. See United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 
383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). That court has held that it is 
generally to be applied in the same manner as its federal 
counterpart. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Pennsylvania v. 
Flanagan, 528 A.2d 134, 135 n.1 (Pa. 1987). Based on this 
fact and APSCUF, we believe the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania would reach the same conclusions in this 
case with respect to the Pennsylvania Contract Clause as 
we have reached in the preceding section with respect to 
the federal Contract Clause. 
 
IV. 
 
The judgment of the district court will be affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
case that employees whose benefits under the Plan have fully vested will 
be affected by the addition of a contribution requirement. Cf. McGrath v. 
Rhode Island Retirement Bd., 88 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 1996) (rights under 
retirement plan with express reservation clause not subject to Contract 
Clause challenge until employees' rights have vested). 
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